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I. Bill Robinson
{1} I am Bill Robinson, and I am pinch-hitting for Mark La Fratta. Mark did something that caused him to
have to go to Gary, I am not sure what it is. Perhaps, Mr. Brown will be able to tell us later on. In any event, it
is a pleasure to be here. A couple of Saturdays ago, I was out sailing in an old boat I have, and we had
wonderful winds. We were wasting in an area on the Rappahannock that I was not very familiar with, and we
were just about to make our last tide in the fifth of six legs of the race, when we ran aground so badly, and so
far, that it looked like one of those photographs after a hurricane, with the boat keeled over. Eventually,
somebody came by and yelled over from his boat, "It sure is a lot easier standing up at a podium in a
courtroom, than what you are doing, is it not, my boy." It was a bailiff in the Federal Judge's Courtroom in
Richmond, and the general proposition he used was correct. And, it is with a little trepidation that I come
because you all are experts at this, and the panelists are certainly experts, and I am simply going to be
introducing them.
{2} Let us begin on this part of the program, which focuses on federal legislation, with what has happened in
other industries, which have formally been subject to substantial regulation, and have moved to deregulated
status, what we might be able to expect based on those lessons, and what we have to look forward to.
{3} Our next speaker is Richard Blackburn. Let me mention at this point, that there is a full biography of all
our speakers behind the material in the blue tab of your binder. Mr. Blackburn comes to us as Executive Vice
President and Federal Counsel of Duke Energy. Before that, he had considerable experience with Nynex, and
served as president of their Worldwide Communications System. He, now, among other duties, is responsible
for Duke's Demograhpic Affairs Program. I would like to welcome him, and to tell him that I appreciate his
being here, and look forward to his remarks.
 
II. Richard Blackburn
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Duke Energy Corporation
{4} Good afternoon, the first thing I want to do is disclaim anything associated with being an expert in gas
and electric industries. I am new to this industry. I became General Counsel to Duke Energy in November. I
spent my entire career before that position, in the telecommunications industry, which I will talk a little bit
about this afternoon. I am scrambling to get up-to-speed on the low-down of gas and electric matters, and am
at the dangerous point in my learning curve, where a few days a week, I operate under the illusion that I have
a critical mass of knowledge. So, I really understand some things from the point of view of a novice, and I
have lots to learn. What I would like to do this afternoon, is talk a little bit about what we believe is the role
of the states and the federal government, as we look at restructuring the electric industry. I will then ground
that discussion, if I could, in some of the things I saw over a couple of decades in the telecommunications
industry. This will highlight a couple of themes that I will come back to several times in my talk.
{5}One theme is that, it is best to stay closest to the environment you are restructuring, and not shift your
focus at all to Washington. When you look at what we have today in the telecommunications industry, you
realize that things are very complex in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and people are debating whether or
not it is working. I will be suggesting that it is not the model you should be using in the electric restructuring.
{6} The second point is that, as we go through this process, somebody needs to make sure they are talking to
customers along the way. Do customers really want this? Another theme in the telecommunications world, is
the restructuring of the telecommunications industry, or that the deregulation was basically hatched in a
conference room in a settlement of trustees, and there was not a single customer in the room. The customers
woke up the next day and were greeted with the prospect of multiple long-distance telephone companies, and
they said, "why?" We have struggled for fifteen years since then, with customers wondering if things have
really improved. Now, that is a brief opening.
{7} What we think is that the electric industry should continue down the path it is traveling today, or
restructuring all of this basically according to the models. It is a distribution piece, a transmission piece, it is a
generation piece. It would be best to proceed the way it is now, and that is largely on a state-by-state, very
local focus. The generation piece can, and should be regulated. Customers should have the choice for
generation, and things happen in generation that make that logical. There are technology changes, there are
cost improvement changes, and there are environmental improvement changes. All of those things occurring
now have made it natural, good, and timely for the deregulation of generation. Distribution, we believe,
should be regulated at the local level, and transmission, we believe should be regulated at the federal level, at
first. The structure of all that and the way customers are treated in all that process, ought, in our view, to be
perceived on a state-by-state basis. Unlike telecommunications, unlike other industries, electric generation
and distribution is an intensely local business. It operates at the local level, as electric plants can build at the
local level, they get built as part of the county development efforts by the states. So, you can see that it is an
intensely local level process, and ought not to be restructured anywhere except at the local level. But, to do
that, you need a few things out of the federal government, but only a few, and a few of them are outlined in
the conference materials.
{8} First, you need legislation to clarify what is the status of FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)
regulation for electric transmission. What is the dividing line between transmission and distribution? Where
do you draw that line? It certainly needs to be a matter of national policy. If that line-drawing process
happens incorrectly or inappropriately, there would be chaos. We support having limited clarification of
FERC jurisdiction to help with the demarcation point between transmission and distribution. Likewise, we
support the movement that is already underway in the country for proper reform. Section 210 of PUHCA,
which causes distribution companies to buy specialized forms and generation, dependent upon whether it is a
reason for consented purchase, from greed power, or whatever, that is simply an idea whose time has passed.
Certainly, the time has passed in a model that deregulates generation, and we would look for proper reform to
clean that up.
{9} The whole issue of stranded costs is one that is severe in this industry. It is one that has to be addressed as
it is, in very simple terms. What portion of the cost structure of a currently integrated, monopolistic, local
electric company will not be recovered when customers are lost to competitors? Those power plants and
distribution systems were built under a compact, under which, the regulators assume that you would retain
your customer base for the life of the plant being built. As competition comes into markets, in an orderly way,
that contract, that assumption, that preface is altered, and certain portions of your customers are going to be
lost to competitors. That is natural, and that is good. You cannot, however, be a shareowner with the
obligation of covering all of those stranded costs, because it is contrary to the premise of the investment that
was made at the time the power plants and distribution facilities were built. So, we support the effort that is
already underway to have national policy declared at that level, along with some congressional legislation.
{10} Fourthly, we support the Public Utility Holding Company Act ("PUHCA") reform, that is simply a
statute to modify or repeal PUHCA, that is already in existence. It fosters vertical integration in the electrical
industry, which is antithetic to the restructuring we are experiencing today, and certainly PUHCA needs to be
repealed. Lastly, there is this whole fundamental issue of power that I will deal with in the Question and
Answer session, if we have time.
{11} We have in place today, the municipals and federally-supported electric generation and distribution
facilities that have different forms of subsidized debt, different forms of public policy of health behind them
that need to be rationalized. There are going to be competitors in the marketplace, and they will need to be on
an even-footing with all the competitors. That is the kind of a basic outline of the limited, enabling legislation
that we view as important from Washington, and nothing more. The rest should proceed, in our view, on a
state level.
{12} Let me turn to the business of why I think there are lessons in the telecommunications world that help
support the view that less is more, when it comes to the role of Washington in the restructuring of an industry
like the electric power industry. I will just mention a quick history here, that I assume most of us know, so I
will go over it quickly.
{13} The telecommunications industry has restructured and become less regulated - not totally deregulated
today - over the last tortuous thirty-year period. It is hard to imagine that it has been that long. It was in the
fall of 1967 that the Federal Communications Commission, ("FCC") first licensed MCI to provide private-
line services from Chicago to St. Louis. That started it. It was the first entry in a major way of another
company, into what was then, a monopolistic telephone industry. Thirty years later, we still have an intensely-
regulated telephone industry at the local level, and still have considerable regulation of long-distance at the
federal level. It has been a long and torturous period. It started in 1968, then it accelerated with the filing of
antitrust suits in the middle 70's by MCI and the federal government. In that case, the federal government's
case was settled in 1981, and that is the settlement that set the mold for restructuring the telecommunications
industry. It separated long-distance from local, forced AT&T to spin-out the operating companies, and it
created this very artificial notion that there is something different about local telephone service than there is
about long-distance service. There was a deal struck with the government, a deal struck in a conference room,
with no customers around, and customers to this day do not understand.
{14} Indeed, when you look at what is going on in the industry today, you see a fairly rapid reintegration of
the industry, which again, is only natural in a free market as that is what customers want. So, from 1984 on,
when you broke up the Bell System, there has been a gradual and increasing deregulation of the industry.
More movement at the federal level, less at the state level, but yet, the constant effort to try to rationalize
where this industry was going over the next decade. This ultimately resulted in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.
{15} Now, there is a lot of debate in the press. We all read it every day about whether the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 is working. It was touted as the deregulation statute of the decade. It would
at last set the rules, reset the registers, deregulate the industry, and people expected things to happen quickly,
but they have not. Laws have been put on the books now for a year and a half, and not that much has really
happened. Now, let us examine, "why not?" Well, the first thing about which we read is the problem that there
is no competition at the local level in telecommunications. The answer to that is that the complaint simply
wrong. At the business level, there is intense competition at the local level. There has been competition for
decades, and it is more intense now, than it ever was. Nynex, the company where I worked for much of my
career, lost ninety-percent of its private-line market in New York City over the course of three years in the
early 90's. Ninety-percent of the private-line market went to competitors.
{16} Now, Nynex is back to better service and innovative pricing, and, in fact, they were (when I left the
business) at about a thirty-percent share of the market, but that is real competition. There is lots of
competition, and there has been for a long time, from very well-known companies you and I read about
everyday. The Teleports of the world now, WorldCom, Teleport, and now AT&T, experience intense
competition. What gets all the press is that there is not so much competition for you and me, as residential
subscribers, sitting in our homes and apartments.
{17} And, is that really true? Well, it is partially true. There are a lot of players out there today that were not
out there two years ago. They are called CLEC's, "competitive local exchange companies," and there are
hundreds of them today. Indeed, they are the darling of Wall Street today, as many of them go public, they
raise funds, and there are already enough of them out there. So, you have got venture capital companies
taking platform companies and doing roll-ups, and taking small, emerging, competitive companies and roll-
ups of these companies merging into the entities of larger competitors.
{18} You also have some pretty big money coming into the arena. Any of you who follow the
telecommunications industry, in particular, the wireless side, during the last several decades know the name
Craig McCoff. Guess who is behind Nextel's very substantial competitor for Strange Company? It is Mr.
McCoff. So, that is what is happening. It is not happening at a lightning pace, but it is clearly happening.
{19} Now, what the problem here is, is that there is no technology drive at the moment at the local level, the
way it was previously at the long-distance level. This is because it is very expensive to build facilities to head
to your house and mine, and it takes a lot of marketing power and marketing money. So, it is a matter of time,
not a matter of whether or not local markets are truly open.
{20} The other problem we have with the telecommunications industry is that there is no further competition
for long distance, than there was two years ago. That was supposed to change too. They were supposed to
have large players coming into the market to compete for long-distance. The thought was that we have the
"Baby Bells" competing for long-distance, and then, none of that has happened. The reason that has not
happened is because we have got a huge set of compromises in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Everybody has a hand in the process. The state can rule on whether or not you pass the fourteen-point
checklist. The FCC can rule on that as well.
{21} Justice has prevailed as a general rule, and what has happened is that the existing long-distance carriers
have used that quagmire of overlapping approvals to keep the "Baby Bells" out of the long-distance market,
claiming the local markets are not sufficiently open to meet the tests of this fourteen-point checklist. That
kind of overlapping complexity with the states, the Department of Justice, and the FCC - all with independent
views, and inconsistent views - is exactly the kind of frustrating and rapid de-structuring that has been
occurring within the industry. That is the kind of backdrop for the industry that I bring to the electric
deregulation process committee. It is not a perfect solution or response to the problems at hand, but my
advice is to leave it to the states, where we are closer to the markets, closer to the customers, and let these
markets restructure one at a time, at a pace that makes sense with the local jurisdiction, and at a pace which
the customers in that area desire. With that, I will quit.
 
Bill Robinson
{22} The next speaker is Mark Darrell. Mark comes to us as General Counsel of Columbia Gas of Virginia.
Prior to that time, he was with the New Jersey Resources Corporation, where he represented it and its natural
gas subsidiary in a number of transactions and regulatory matters.
 
III. Mark Darrell
General Counsel, Columbia Gas of Virginia, Inc.
{23} Thank you very much, and also thank you to the Conference for inviting me to speak. I am supposed to
address federal legislation and electricity. Of course, I do not know much about electric deregulation, but I
have been through, of course, natural gas restructuring, and hopefully, I can give the electric industry some
pointers.
{24} Before I get launched into my discussion, I wanted to just make people familiar with the basic
traditional structure of the natural gas business. It is probably not familiar to most people that, with
production, gathering, transmission, and distribution, you also have the adjunct to gathering - the storage
function. The pipeline company was the conspicuous part of the industry in those days, as they purchased gas
from producers, and resold it to distribution companies, who then sold it to the ultimate consumer.
{25} Deregulation in the business is basically taking place in all segments, but most of it is taking place in
the production and transmission segments. I want to focus on producer pricing, especially to review the major
events that involve regulation, and the deregulation to produce the prices. First, is the Phillips Petroleum
decision, which took place in 1954, in which the Supreme Court held that, at a minimum, the natural gas of
interstate commerce was subject to the Federal Power Commission's jurisdiction. Then, in the United States,
during 1954-1978, there was pervasive regulation on producing prices by the Federal Power Commission,
and later, the Federal Regulatory Commission, which ultimately resulted in curtailments and basic shortages
in the international markets, particularly the Middle East around 1970. Two major events involving
deregulation in reducing prices were the American Gas Policy Act in 1978, which involved partial
deregulation of prices, and the Key Control Act of 1989, which incidentally, controlled all user prices.
{26} So, the Commodity Market became involved during the regulatory events. This involvement began in
1979, which is really when the NPA (National Power Act) was enacted. The first period we have is 1979-
1982, which essentially comprised the rule of the seller's market for natural gas. With the rising prices, you
had increased payoff provisions by the pipelines, and you had pipelines signing up for long-term contracts.
Then, you have the period of 1982-1985, which we describe as the gas bubble period. That was a period
when supply essentially outstripped the demand, and you had industrials beginning to look for alternatives,
such as buying pipeline gas, and you had the stock and natural gas markets. It also marked the beginnings of
take-or-pay policy provisions, as current supply outstripped demand. The period from 1985-1992 was
dominated by take-or-pay transactions, and pipelines in current take-or-pay situations, handle costs, settling
and recovering those costs through take-or-pay recovery mechanisms. It increased spot market purchases,
buying overseas, and declining purchases by interstate companies.
{27} The market today, I guess, is competitive. Since it was totally deregulated, at least on the commodity
side with respect to production, you have greater market efficiency because of the numerous sellers and
marketers of natural gas. You have the extended use of natural derivative instruments to make possible
managing the price policy that has occurred in the market, and you also have a contract that includes a great
deal of pricing flexibility.
{28} Let me now move to transmission unbundling. Before 1983, the traditional role of interstate pipelines,
as I mentioned before, was the merchant role, which involved the activity of buying and selling natural gas.
There was very little stand-alone transportation, with the exception of Texas. And, you had a series of FERC
actions which began the process of unbundling. We will not go into this in any detail, except to say, that
between 1983 and 1992, when these orders were issued, and the process began where the companies began to
assume the ability to purchase their own supplies - pipeline supplies.
{29} At the same time, you have the Department of Industry pipeline supplies, and you have Order 636 of
FERC emerging, which involved partial unbundling. Order 636 involved the complete unbundling of pipeline
services. In order 636, essentially the pipelines were required to separate the sale from the transportation
functions. They were required to exit the sales-release sale business. They could have sales contracts, but
were required to convert those contracts to transportation capacity. This brief experimental rate design
became the great design for most interstate pipelines, which allowed the recovery of one-hundred percent of
fixed costs. Those companies on the secondary capacity market also experienced a change in their ability to
bring in business. The pipeline system, which enhanced their ability to make off-system sales and release
capacity into the secondary market. Finally, you had pipeline recovery of l00% of prudently incurred
transition costs. There was distribution of unbundling. There was a move to unbundle services with large
interruptible customers in the 1980s. Essentially not a whole lot happened until the 1990s, when
transportation for the commercial, and ultimately residential, markets began. The pilot programs across the
country began to happen, including here in Virginia.
{30} One of the lessons learned from the short term trip through history of natural gas deregulation, is that in
the area of production, the laws of supply and demand have actually worked. If you compare the way the
market worked in the early days through a period when there was transition until today, most people agree
that deregulation of producer prices has been very successful. It has been essentially the balance of supply
and demand since 1992. There has been an increasing sophistication in the way in which gas was purchased
and sold, including the use of financial delivery tools in order to manage price risk. The second lesson is that
the secondary capacity market has flourished since Order 636. Pipelines continue to play the role of the
primary player in the market by building and selling pipeline capacity. However, holders of firm capacity on
interstate pipelines have the ability to resell those capacity rights of the capacity release and the bulk of
system sales. As the market has evolved, the capacity market has become "commoditized". Essentially,
financial houses are beginning to develop tools that will enable people to trade capacity and make profits.
{31} The third point is that deregulation of interstate pipelines allowed companies to tailor their gas
purchasing strategies to suit their own needs. In the past, these companies were required to purchase gas from
pipelines at essentially the pipelines' average system cost. This created distortions in the market where the
purchases occurred at higher load factors and system costs, fought the companies which purchased at lower
than average system costs at FERC and other places on issues of cost allocation. A lot of those issues have
now dissipated because companies now have the ability to structure purchases that suit their own load factors.
This is presently occurring in commodity markets; it has not occurred as much in the pipeline transportation
capacity market since they have not had the opportunity to structure their transportation capacity contracts
with interstate pipelines.
{32} Gas purchasing risk has now moved down to the local level. The question for today is, as far as
distribution is concerned, should the consumer assume some of this risk. I would submit that they do so in
other areas. If consumers do not have gas or electricity, they essentially heat their homes with heating oil or
propane. Clearly they have to make these choices every day and there is no reason why that cannot be done in
the natural gas business.
{33} Another lesson is that deregulation has increased the number of sellers in the market. When local
distribution companies (LDCs)purchased gas years ago, they bought from one to three interstate pipelines in
their long term contracts. Now it is very typical for LDCs to purchase gas from twenty or more suppliers
under shorter term contracts. The flexibility that now exists in the market allows LDCs to purchase gas using
substantially more diverse sources than they did in the past. This allows them to price their product at market
prices.
{34} Deregulation challenged the basic regulatory compact at the federal level. Section 7 of the Natural Gas
Act is essentially the equivalent of the LDC's obligation to serve customers. FERC has essentially
revolutionized Section 7 by making it less reliable for LDCs to rely on pipeline long term contracts. That
simply means that market forces, rather FERC's certificate authority, will govern the future allocation of
pipeline capacity.
{35} The next lesson learned is really a question, whether the pipeline segment will survive or thrive with the
natural gas deregulation. In the past, pipelines relied on long term commitments in order to construct pipeline
capacity. However, as mentioned before, in the secondary market there has been a "commoditization" of
pipeline capacity. The belief is that "commoditization" will transfer over to the primary capacity markets so
that pipelines will not have the long term purchase, supply, or delivery commitments to LDCs as they did in
the past. Will pipelines prosper on short-term commitments? I would submit that it depends on their ability to
withstand the risks. It may very well be, or should be, that deregulation of transmission capacity gives
customers the option to purchase either from the pipeline or somebody else, under the assumption that there
are many sellers of transmission capacity. This may be true whether it is the pipeline itself or whether it is
someone's old, long term or firm pipeline capacity.
{36} The other significant question is whether investment banks should finance future pipeline products on
short term commitments? The answer here is unclear. The ultimate lesson is that in the areas where there is
workable competition, the laws of supply and demand do work, and should govern when possible. What are
the characteristics of workable competition? It is the presence of numerous sellers and buyers in the market,
and also the absence of market power in one player or small group of players.
{37} The next topic is unbundling, which is essentially about breaking down the benefits of the competitive
market to residential customers. As mentioned before, those customers who are using heating oil or propane
already have the ability to choose from different suppliers. Those options should be made available to
customers of natural gas as well. Some of the options that are available include fixed prices and index prices,
and frequent-flier-type programs. These programs include weather-proof bills where customers can decide up
front how much they are going to pay for gas in a particular winter and consume whatever they wish.
{38} I am supposed to talk about federal legislation so let me just briefly cover it. In general, my view is
Congress should allow the states to pursue unbundling at their own speeds. However, I do believe that if
unbundling does not occur in an expedient manner, Congress will probably step in. Richard alluded to the
fact that there might be some major federal action at some level, and maybe that should be the case, in order
to create a seamless energy marketplace within the fifty states. I will just point out that, in terms of what
happened in the natural gas business, Congress only acted in the production area and most of the deregulation
that has taken place has done so at the FERC and at local LDC levels.
{39} Finally, up to this point, I have been pretty much presenting my own views. Let me give you a company
view. That view relates to the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA). Columbia Gas is
one of three registered public utility holding companies that are gas companies. PUHCA is essentially an
antiquated act that really needs to be repealed. There is simply no reason why a company like Columbia
should not be able to compete with a company like Aniline, which is frankly a lot larger and probably has
substantial assets at its disposal. That concludes my remarks and I would be happy to take any questions.
 
Bill Robinson
{40} Thank you Mark. Our third and final speaker is Henry Brown. Henry has had an excellent opportunity
to observe Congress for a number of years. He is presently the Vice President of Governmental Affairs of
Entergy Corporation, and prior to that time had similar responsibilities with Carolina Light and Power.
Welcome Henry.
 
IV. S.M. Henry Brown, Jr.
Vice President- Governmental Affairs, Entergy Corporation
{41} Thank you, Bill, that was a better introduction than I got last time. I was introduced as being invited
because they wanted the latest dope from Washington.
{42} As I looked over the attendance list, I must say I was somewhat intimidated. I can recall the story,
which I am sure many of you have heard, about the fellow who died and went to heaven. One of his first
demands of St. Peter was that he get everybody in heaven together because he wanted to talk about the great
Johnstown flood and how terrible it was. St Peter reluctantly said, "Well I will get everybody together, but I
want you to remember that Noah is going to be in the audience."
{43} Thank you very much for inviting me to share my views and those of Entergy on the electric utility
restructuring. I am going to be a little bit more specific than the first two speakers. My domicile is in
Washington, inside the Beltway, so I am going to have an inside-the-Beltway mentality about all of this. You
will have to kind of clear through that as I talk. What I am going to do is talk a little bit about the legislative
proposals that are currently pending, what Congress may do this year, and what we feel they may ultimately
do. As most of you are aware, Entergy is a multi-state electric utility holding company, with operations in
Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas and Texas. Most recently they acquired the Electric Distribution Company
in Melbourne, Australia, and London, England. Like our fellow member, Columbia Gas, we are a registered
holding company under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. We are one of twelve electric
utility holding companies in the electric business. The other three make gas. Entergy was one of the first
utilities to file an open assets transmission during the early 90's. We were strong supporters of the Energy
Policy Act in 1992. Entergy, along with Duke Energy, is a charter member of Alliance for Competitive
Electricity, known as ACE, one of the first organizations that came together to support the transition to retail
competition.
{44} Numerous restructuring bills are currently pending in Congress that would place some type of federal
footprint on retail competition. It is clear as one reviews the various proposals that there is no consensus on
what the federal role should be. Some legislators argue that federal legislation should address only those
things that the federal government can handle, while others argue that comprehensive federal legislation is
needed to avoid a hodge-podge of conflicting state retail competition rules and regulations.
{45} The Bumpers-Gorton Bill in the Senate proposes a January 2002 date certain for retail access, full
stranded cost recovery, and a non-by-passable charge for universal service programs. It grants FERC
authority to create transmission regions and designate an independent system operator to manage each
system. It removes the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) fence as well as TVA's monopoly within its service
area. It adopts required annual renewable percentages of up to 12% in 2013 from 5% in 2003, and includes
hydroelectric power. It repeals PUHCA and Section 210 of PURPA (Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act).
{46} In the House, Representative Shapersville also adopts a date for certain retail access, requiring states to
establish retail choice by December 2000, or be preempted by FERC. States are required to consider a
stranded cost recovery charge, but are not required to actually do so. Shapersville proposes a renewables
program, but does not favor hydro-facilities such as the Bumpers-Gorton Bill. PUHCA and Section 210 of
PURPA are repealed, relating to retail access.
{47} Two draft bills in the House have recently been circulating and have gained favorable attention. One
proposal by Representative Cliff Sterns of Florida repeals PUHCA and PURPA. It encourages states to adopt
retail competition, but does not mandate such. A reciprocity provision forbids utilities from competing for
business in other states unless their own state is open for competition. Another proposal by Representative
Largent calls for a January 2001 date for certain retail access, but grandfathers all existing state retail
programs. It also expands FERC authority over public power groups, liability standards, and ISO
(independent system operators).
{48} In the Senate, Senator Nichols recently floated his proposal, in an indirect attempt to encourage retail
competition, that eliminates the state's historic power to regulate retail sales under Section 201 of the Federal
Power Act. Nichols expects that once state monopoly franchises are open to challenge, courts will strike them
down as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on state interference with interstate
commerce. The proposal also eliminates the state-action defense in antitrust suits challenging state monopoly
franchises.
{49} Two other pending bills of note are Senator Thomas' bill that grants the states the authority and
responsibility for deciding whether or not to adopt retail access, and Senator Bingham's bill giving FERC
expanded jurisdiction over retail transmission reliability and ISO formation. Bingham's bill does not include a
mandate for retail competition.
{50} In late March, the Clinton Administration weighed down on its own restructuring plan. Generally that
plan provides for full retail access by January 2003, but it defers to lower cost states, and allows any state to
opt out if it believes its consumers would be better off under the status quo system or its own unique
restructuring proposal. Environmental changes are prominent in the plan, as you might imagine, which
requires 5 1/2% of each utility's power sales to come from renewable energy resources, excluding hydro, by
2010. An annual $3 billion public benefit fund would provide matching federal dollars for low income energy
assistance, energy efficiency programs, consumer education, and the development of emerging technology.
The program would be funded through an interconnection fee which proposes caps of 1 million per kilowatt
hour.
{51} The plan clarifies EPA's authority to require a cost effective interstate NOx (nitrogen oxide) emissions
trading system, but does not adopt a plan for Carbon emissions or Ozone transport. The Administration plan
also gives FERC more authority to oversee transmission systems and to ensure reliability, such as authority to
require that transmission facilities be placed under the control of an ISO. The plan encourages the formation
of a regional transmission planning agency to develop siting rules for new generation transmission and
distribution facilities. The FERC would also be granted additional authority to remedy market power
concentration in the wholesale market, and to provide backup market power remedies when the state has
insufficient authority to remedy market power itself.
{52} Consumer protections are also included in the Administration's plan. The Secretary of Energy is
authorized to establish nationally uniform labels for electricity pricing, terms, conditions, generation source,
and generation emissions characteristics.
{53} What does all this mean for 1998? In a word - nothing. That is at least as far as this year is concerned.
Representative Schaefer's Energy and Power Subcommittee has had so many false starts that if this were a
track meet, they would have been disqualified a long time ago. The latest word is that a bill will be marked up
this month. I doubt it. There is absolutely no consensus on just about any issue. A date for certainty, stranded
cost, public power, environmental provisions, you name it, it is a point of contention. With less than forty
legislative days left this year, and with the tobacco settlement issue and nuclear waste legislation to name a
couple of items, I can't see any movement in the House on restructuring legislation. In the Senate, Energy and
Natural Resources Chairman Frank Murkowski is not inclined to move anyway. His committee primarily
consists of members from predominantly low cost, states-rights oriented, western, rural states that appear to
have no real appetite for such a controversial bill in an election year. The Administration is known to be
developing legislative language to supplement the release of their concept document. However, the
resignation of Secretary Peña and the process of identifying, nominating and confirming his replacement,
coupled with the continuing controversy plaguing the Administration over air quality issues, further
complicates the possibility of it exerting any real influence on the issue this year.
{54} Now what should Congress do? In our opinion, Congress should repeal the Public Utility Holding
Company Act this year. As you may know, a majority passed a bill to this effect it in the Senate Committee
and it is ready for floor action in the Senate. No bill has, however, been introduced in the House. PUHCA is
already impeding registered holding companies' ability to respond to competitive pressures. It is impeding
our ability to position ourselves to mitigate our competitive exposure by denying our ability to diversify in
other utilities. It is also a barrier to entry by other potential energy suppliers. PUHCA repeal should not be
held hostage by passage of a full comprehensive bill. Its effective repeal should not be contingent on all states
in a holding company's service area having full retail competition as the legislation I just mentioned entails.
While recognizing the rights of the states to manage electric utility restructuring, Entergy, as a multi-state
company, finds itself facing a somewhat unique dilemma along with other energy holding companies. We
envision the possibility of each of our states coming to differing and conflicting conclusions, particularly in
the area of stranded cost recovery. In such circumstances, we feel there may be a possibility of major
differences. That's the $64 question. The current pace of state activity and the lack of any consensus at this
time at the federal level suggests to me that federal legislation will ultimately be enabling legislation. That is,
federal legislation will address only those issues the states themselves cannot resolve: PUHCA and PURPA
repeal transmission issues, possibly reciprocity issues, and nuclear fission. Thank you.
[**] NOTE: All endnote citations in this article follow the conventions appropriate to the edition of THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION that was in effect at the time of publication. When citing to
this article, please use the format required by the Seventeenth Edition of THE BLUEBOOK, provided below for
your convenience.
Bill Robinson, Richard Blackburn, Mark Darrell, S. M. Henry Brown, Jr., Congress and Deregulation:
Federal Legislative Issues Past, Present and Future, 5 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 2 (Fall 1998), at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v5i1/speech3.html.
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